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Implications of Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium
on the Pinocbet Precedent: A Setback for International
Human Rights Litigation?
Sarah C. Rispin"
In 1999, the British House of Lords issued a landmark decision abrogating
Augusto Pinoche's immunity under international law as a former head of state,
declaring him subject to extradition for the crime of torture.1 The former Chilean
dictator was eventually declared too ill to stand trial and returned to Chile. Still, the
Law Lords' decision was hailed as a major breakthrough by the international human
rights community, and spawned a campaign to bring heads of state and other leaders
accused of human rights abuses to trial in foreign courts.
The Pinochet decision brought to the fore the tension between the increasingly
broad reach of international human rights law and the fundamental international law
principle of sovereign equality.2 Criticism of the decision ranged from the basic notion
that this was an impermissible abrogation of Chile's sovereignty, to the more nuanced
argument that international prosecution of former dictators would detract from
certain nations' abilities to make the transition from dictatorship to democracy.
This year, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), in Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium, had the opportunity to consider a similar issue-whether Belgium
could bring Congo's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdoulaye Yerodia, to trial in its
courts for alleged "crimes against humanity."3 The ICJ denied Belgium's claim on the
* BA 1996, Williams Colege; JD Candidate 2003, University of Chicago.
1. See Regina v Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinocbet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 AC 147 (House of Lords
1999) (hereinafter Pinochet XI).
2. Head of state and diplomatic immunity are derivative of sovereign equality among nations. See The
Schooner Exchange v McFaddon, 11 US (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) ('This perfect equality and
absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual
intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in
which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive
territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation. ... One of these is
admitted to be the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a
foreign territory.").
3. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium),
2002 ICJ General List No 121 (Feb 14, 2002) (hereinafter Congo v Belgium), available online at
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specific ground that incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs are immune from
criminal suit abroad, notwithstanding allegations of having committed "war crimes" or
"crimes against humanity.'A By clarifying that the Pinocbet precedent does not extend
by force of logic to incumbent officials, Congo v. Belgium has already had a real world
impact-causing the Belgian Court of Appeals to dismiss the prosecution of Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon for war crimes, which had been brought under the same
statute that authorized the Yerodia prosecution! It may also have a broader effect.
The main holding of Congo v. Belgium is technically consistent with Pinocbet,
insofar as the ICJ ruled on the immunity of incumbent rather than former officials. The
reasoning of the ICJ, however, is in serious tension with that of the Law Lords, and
the opinion could even be read as a rejection of Pinocbet. Insofar as Pinocbet was
considered by many to represent a sea change in the international law on official
immunity, the ICJ opinion casts doubt on this belief
This development will consider the impact of the Congo v. Belgium decision on the
Pinocbet precedent and the law on official immunity for serious international crimes.
Part I will briefly review the legal bases for the Pinocbet decision. Part II will lay out
the legal bases of the majority opinion in Congo v. Belgium, and examine what of
Pinochet survives that opinion. Part III will examine the main Congo v. Belgium
concurrence and highlight its attempt to salvage the Pinocbet precedent-an attempt
which throws into relief the fact that Pinocbet has, in fact, been undercut.
I. PINOCHET
In October 1998, a Spanish court issued an international arrest warrant against
Augusto Pinochet for acts of torture, hostage taking, and other conduct carried out
during his reign of power in Chile, invoking universal jurisdiction as a basis for its
action. Pinochet, who had entered Britain for back surgery in September 1998, was
arrested by British authorities pursuant to the Spanish warrant. Pinochet's challenge
to this action eventually reached the House of Lords, where a majority of the Law
Lords found that, despite his status as a former head of state, Pinochet was not
entitled to immunity from arrest and extradition on the specific charges of torture and
6
conspiracy to commit torture.
<htrp://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe-ijudgment-toc.htm> (visited
Sept 15, 2002).
4. Id at H 54, 58.
5. See Arret de la Cour D'Appel de Bruxelles, Sharon Ariel, Yaron Amos et autres, art 136 bis, al 2 et 235 bis
CIC (June 26, 2002) (hereinafter Sharon).
6. Under traditional principles of international law, Pinochet, as a former head of state, would have
been expected to enjoy immunity ratione materiae, a subject matter immunity that prevents the
official acts of one state from being called into question in the courts of another. See Ian Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law 330-31 (Clarendon 3d ed 1979).
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In order to reach the issue of whether Pinochet enjoyed immunity under British
law, the Law Lords had to first interpret the relevant international law.7 As a result,
the Pinocbet ruling has international legal value beyond the UK. The reasoning used by
the various Law Lords, however, is often vague and somewhat contradictory,8 making
it difficult to divine the exact legal impact of the decision.
Six Law Lords found that Pinochet did not enjoy immunity for the torture
charges. Of these, four rested their reasoning on the grave nature of the underlying
crime: Lords Hutton and Millett seemed to believe that Pinochet's immunity was
abridged because of torture's status as a jus cogens crime;9 Lord Browne-Wilkinson
asserted that Pinochet's immunity was abrogated because torture is a "fillly
constituted international crime;'0 and Lord Hope reasoned that Pinochet's immunity
was abrogated because, though torture per se was not a serious international crime,
the alleged torture was "on such a scale as to amount to an international crime."" In
other words, Lords Hutton, Millett, Browne-Wilkinson and Hope all seem to agree
that Pinochet's immunity somehow melted away in the face of torture's status as a
"serious international crime"-whether established as such by jus cogens or
international treaty.
The remaining two Law Lords took alternate approaches: Lord Saville rested his
conclusion on a theory of implied waiver of immunity, asserting that the UN
Convention Against Torture, which had been ratified by Britain, Spain and Chile, per
se abrogated Pinochet's immunity.12 Lord Phillips, perhaps most radically, reasoned
that because national jurisdiction over universal crimes under international law was so
new, traditional immunities did not apply."
Note that five of these six nonetheless were of the opinion that current heads of
state continue to enjoy absolute immunity under international law for acts of
torture-though they failed to provide any reason for their conclusion.'4 This
7. The Law Lords interpreted Britain's State Immunity Act as incorporating developing international
law standards.
8. The House of Lords issued its opinion in seriatim; while there was a clear majority as to the outcome
in the case, each Lord presented his own basis for the outcome.
9. See, for example, Pinocbet II at 251-65 (cited in note 1) (Lord Hutton). Lord Millett also subscribed
to this view. Id at 275.
10. See id at 204 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
11. See id at 246 (Lord Hope).
12. See id at 266-67 (Lord Saville), referring to the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment ('Torture Convention"), art 1, S Treaty Doc No 100-20 (1988),
1465 UNTS 85 [or General Assembly Res No 39/46, UN Doc No A/RES/39/46 (1984)]. Several
other Lords believed that the Torture Convention played some role in the abrogation. See Curtis A.
Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinocbet and International Human Rights Litigation, 97 Mich L Rev
2129,2140-43 (1999).
13. See Pinocbet at 284-90 (cited in note 1) (Lord Phillips).
14. Lords Hutton, Millett, Phillips, Saville and Browne-Wilkinson.
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concession provides a narrow basis on which to conclude that Congo v. Belgium is in
line with Pinocbet.
II. CONGO V. BELGIUM AND ITS IMPACT ON PINOCHET
One of the direct effects of the Pinocbet decision was to embolden Belgium to
issue an arrest warrant for Congo's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aboulaye Yerodia, for
crimes against humanity, in connection with the delivery of hate-filled speeches in
August 1998 during the Tutsi-Hutu conflict which incited acts of mass murder. 5 The
cases are directly analogous: as in Pinocbet, in Congo v. Belgium we see a former colonial
power (Belgium) concerned with atrocities allegedly committed in its former colony
(Congo) by a government official (Yerodia), invoking universal jurisdiction to attempt
to bring him to justice. But Belgium was not as successful as Spain in this effort. The
ICJ disposed of Belgium's case based on the fact that, at the time Belgium issued its
warrant, Yerodia was an incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs. 6 By declining to
extend the Pinocbet precedent to incumbent, as well as former, officials, the ICJ made it
clear that Pinocbet did not mark a turning point in the international law on official
immunity. Further, the basis upon which it ruled suggests that Pinochet is no longer
sound precedent.
The Court ruled that under customary international law ("CIL'), incumbent
Foreign Ministers are immune from criminal jurisdiction abroad.7 Using quite formal,
function-driven analysis, the Court noted that CIL accords Ministers of Foreign
Affairs immunity "not ... for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective
performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States."" It follows, the
Court concluded, that because arrest or threat of arrest abroad while in office for any
offense-whether committed before or during the Minister's term in office, in an
official or private capacity--would impede a Minister from effectively performing his
or her official functions, jurisdiction over such officials was against international law.' 9
On its face, this holding is consistent with Pinocbet, insofar as five out of the six
Law Lords who believed Pinochet's immunity to have been abridged stated that the
15. This occurred in the context of the ethnic warfare between the Tutsis and the Hutus that was at the
heart of the Rwandan civil war. During that conflict, mobs were induced to genocidal action
through, for example, inflammatory broadcasts on government radio stations. For a description of
the climate at the time, see Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be
Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (Farrar 1998).
16. Though at the time the case was argued he was no longer in office, the court decided the case as if he
were.
17. See Congo v Belgium at U 53-54 (cited in note 3) ('The Court accordingly concludes that the
functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or her
office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability."). See
also id at 53 (laying out the functional reasons that this must be the case).
18. Id at 153.
19. Id at V[ 53-55.
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immunity of incumbent heads of state nonetheless remains intact. Yet it is at least in
serious tension with Pinocbet, which failed to consider the functional concerns that
drove the ICJ's opinion here. Further, Congo v. Belgium could even be read as a
rejection of Pinocbet, as it (a) rejects as CIL the basis on which four of the six Law
Lords came to their conclusion, and (b) does not acknowledge as legal the
international prosecution of a former head of state where neither the state itself, nor
the international community, has given leave for such prosecution.
First, the majority opinion in Congo v. Belgium casts doubt on whether, as the Law
Lords alleged in Pinocbet, a CIL norm has emerged abrogating official immunity for
"serious international crimes." Recall that four of the six Law Lords held that
Pinochet's immunity was abrogated because of torture's status as a "serious
international crime" in one form or another." Belgium attempted to cite this aspect of
Pinocbet as persuasive legal precedent for the proposition that incumbent immunity
does not hold up in the face of "serious international crimes," contending "that an
exception to the immunity rule was accepted [in Pinocbet] in the case of serious crimes
under international law."2' The ICJ dismissed this argument, and concluded that it
was "unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under CIL any form of
exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability
to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity."22
Second, the majority in Congo v. Belgium laid out four circumstances under which
high officials could be prosecuted internationally-and did not include the
circumstances of the Pinochet prosecution in this exposition. This pregnant silence
further undercuts the precedential value of the Pinochet decision.
While dismissing the Yerodia prosecution, the majority took pains to point out
that its holding was not meant to shield all high officials indefinitely.23 Such persons, it
noted, enjoy no criminal immunity under international law under four specific
circumstances: (i) if charged within their own countries; (ii) if their own state has
explicitly waived immunity; (iii) "in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to
his or her period of office, [or] in respect of acts committed during that period of
office in a private capacity"; or (iv) if a properly constituted international tribunal,
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the
International Criminal Court, established pursuant to a UN resolution or
20. See part I.
21. See Congo v Belgium at 156 (cited in note 3).
22. Id at 58.
23. Id at 60 ('The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any
crimes they might have committed ... Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain
period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal
responsibility.").
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international treaty with a specific grant of jurisdiction over that person, were
convened.24 It should be noted that this list maps out only traditionally accepted
boundaries of official immunity, maintaining a high level of concern for state
sovereignty."
Notably absent from this list is a scenario close to that under which Pinochet's
immunity was abrogated by the Law Lords. Pinochet was prosecuted abroad, by the
court of a country that had been granted no leave by the international community to
pursue him. Chile had not explicitly waived Pinochet's immunity: thus Lord Saville's
theory that signing the Torture Convention was an implied waiver would be
insufficient in the eyes of the ICJ. And while the First and Second Law Lords had
advanced the theory that Pinochet's crimes were so heinous that they could not be
considered to have been committed in his "public" capacity, this is, at best, a creative
characterization of the capacity in which Pinocher was acting, and not acknowledged
in the exceptions to immunity ratione materiae laid out by the majority in exception
(iii).
Thus, if the Pinocbet case came up today, it would be difficult to argue that Spain
could legally prosecute the former dictator under any of the main theories employed
by the Law Lords. The ICJ has rejected the notion put forward by Lords Hutton,
Millett, Browne-Wilkinson and Hope that CIL now tells us that official immunity
fades away in the face of serious international crimes. And by failing to include the
Pinochet scenario in its list of situations in which high officials can be prosecuted, the
ICJ has cast the theories of the other Law Lords in doubt.
24. Id at 61.
25. With regard to the first exception, officials charged within their own countries have never enjoyed
immunity under international law. With regard to the second, because official immunity derives
from sovereign immunity, it is accepted that explicit state waiver is sufficient to abrogate immunity.
See, for example, In re Doe v United States, 860 F2d 40, 45 (2d Cir 1988) (holding that the Philippine
government's waiver of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos's head-of-state immunity was sufficient to
strip them of that immunity). The third exception simply maps those circumstances in which
immunity ratione personae-a status immunity that attaches to a high official while in office for the
purpose of allowing him to perform that office-traditionally does not apply. See Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law at 330-32 (cited in note 6). Only the fourth exception
acknowledges a situation in which an official's immunity might be abrogated without regard to his
state's sovereignty concerns. However, such prosecutions have been an accepted part of the
international legal landscape since Nuremberg, and are firmly limited here to instances where the
international community has made a formal decision driven by the exigencies of the situation to
abrogate sovereign immunity.
26. See Regina v Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1 AC 61 (House of Lords 1998)
(hereinafter Pinocbet I). This theory was taken up by the main concurrence. See part III.
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III. THE SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGES HIGGINS, KOOIJMANS AND
BUERGENTHAL IN CONGO V. BELGIUM
The main concurrence in Congo v. Belgium, written by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans
and Buergenthal, agreed with the majority on the narrow point that incumbent
officials remain immune under international law from criminal prosecution abroad.'
Yet it goes on to air a much more expansive notion of why and under what
circumstances the traditional immunity enjoyed by high officials may be abrogated-
in order, perhaps, to leave room for cases such as Pinocbet, should they arise in the
fiuture.
The concurrence starts in the same place as the majority, saying that although
officials may enjoy immunity for certain acts in certain circumstances, they
nonetheless do not enjoy impunity from ultimate liability. But while the majority
seems anxious only to avoid the accusation that its ruling is a path to impunity for
culpable officials, the concurrence goes well beyond this, to assert as an emerging
international norm the need to ensure that "the perpetrators of serious international
crimes do not go unpunished."2 It rejects the idea put forth by the majority that such
a norm can be served by allowing prosecution to proceed within the four exceptions
the majority laid out, offering instead a balancing test.
Weighed in the balance are: (i) "the interest of the international 'community of
mankind' in preventing impunity from grave crimes against its members"; as against
(ii) "the interest of the 'community of States' in allowing State officials to act freely on
the inter-State level without unwarranted interference."3' Perhaps in a nod to the main
concerns of the majority, the concurrence notes that the second, sovereignty-oriented
element will never disappear off the scale, writing that the interest in preventing
impunity "does not ipsofacto mean that immunities are unavailable whenever impunity
0,2
would be the outcome.
According to the concurrence, the following four outcomes strike the right
balance: First, arrest warrants may not be issued against incumbent Foreign Ministers,
27. See Congo v Belgium, separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal (hereinafter
"separate opinion") at 1 (cited in note 3) ("'e generally agree with ... the conclusions [the Court]
reaches.").
28. See id, separate opinion at 78 (noting, with respect to the majority's statement in 60, that "we
could not agree more-that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for
Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have
committed").
29. See id, separate opinion at 174.
30. See id, separate opinion at 175 ("A balance ... must be struck between two sets of functions which
are both valued by the international community.").
31. Id.
32. Id, separate opinion at 179.
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for the functional reasons behind immunity ratione materiae.33 This is in agreement
with the majority holding.
Second, incumbent Foreign Ministers may not be absolutely immune during
private travels.'" This finding is directly at odds with that of the majority, which ruled
that the free movement of Foreign Ministers abroad must not be limited, whether
they are traveling on personal or private business, as they must be free to communicate
with their home governments and interact with officials from other governments at a
moment's notice as the needs of their countries dictate. That said, it is hard to
imagine, under the standard laid out by the concurrence-that Foreign Ministers
"may not be subjected to measures which would prevent effective performance of the
functions of a Foreign Minister"35-when immunity during private travels could
actually be abridged.
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, incumbent officials may not be immune
to suit if it becomes apparent that their government is keeping them in office for an
indeterminate period to forestall prosecution. No country has ever tried to assert
universal jurisdiction over a de facto former official and been rebuffed by such a false
front. But it is certainly conceivable that such an issue could arise, and that a
prosecuting country would cite to this concurrence as support that it should be
allowed to proceed. (This, remember, was in the background of the Pinocbet case, as
Pinochet had named himself "Senator for life" before stepping down.)
Fourth, the main concurrence held that Foreign Ministers and other high
officials may not be immune after they leave office for "serious international crimes"
committed while in office, even if those acts are part of carrying out their duties.7 Not
only does this fourth exception fit within the balancing test, but also, it would seem at
first glance to fit within the third exception advanced by the majority-that officials
do not enjoy immunity for acts committed during that period of office in a private
capacity. Self-consciously echoing one theory advanced by the First and Second Law
Lords' rulings on how Pinochet's immunity was abrogated,' the concurrence reasons
that such crimes "cannot be regarded as official acts because they are neither normal
State functions nor functions that a State alone (in contrast to an individual) can
perform." 9 This, the concurrence contends, is supported by various traditional sources
33. Id, separate opinion at 83.
34. Id, separate opinion at 84.
35. Id.
36. Id, separate opinion at 178.
37. Id, separate opinion at 185.
38. See id (citing Pinochet I (Lords Steyn and Nichols of Birkenhead) and Pinocbet II (Lords Hutton and
Phillips)).
39. Id, separate opinion at 85.
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of CIL; in support of this notion, it cites legal commentary' and "State practice, as
evidenced in judicial decisions and opinions"-including Pinocbet.4'
With this, the concurrence attempts to leave room for future prosecution of
figures like Pinochet. While this is technically consistent with the majority opinion, it
will be difficult for prosecutors in future human rights cases to successfully cite this
aspect of the concurrence. As noted above, the majority failed to include this theory in
the four exceptions it acknowledged to immunity ratione materiae.42 Further, it is
difficult to get around the fact that the majority, when confronted with the Pinocbet
precedent, was unable to find any evidence of CIL creating "any form of exception to
the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war
crimes or crimes against humanity."' The implication is that the majority does not
believe that war crimes or crimes against humanity "cannot be regarded as official
acts"; a fortiori it would not believe that "serious international crimes.. "cannot be
regarded as official acts."
IV. CONCLUSION
Once the taboo of prosecuting former heads of state was broken in Pinocbet, it
was unclear what role, if any, sovereignty concerns would play in the quest to bring
accused officials to justice. Human rights groups, such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International, stepped into the breach, campaigning to bring former and
incumbent high officials to justice. These efforts met with initial success in Belgium,
with the prosecutions launched against Yerodia and Sharon.
The ICJ, in Congo v. Belgium, firmly put to rest the notion that incumbent high
officials can be prosecuted under international law, barring explicit waiver of
immunity by that official's state, or pursuant to an explicit grant of jurisdiction to an
international criminal court constituted pursuant to a treaty or UN resolution. This
bore fruit in the dismissal, six months later, by the Belgian Court of Appeals of the
Sharon prosecution, on the grounds that, following Congo v. Belgium, Belgian
prosecutors could not issue arrest warrants against such officials, and to try them in
absentia was against international law.'
The question remains under what circumstances, if any, may former officials now
be prosecuted? At the very least, Congo v. Belgium pushes the pendulum back toward a
40. Id ("It is now increasingly claimed in the literature ... that serious international crimes cannot be
regarded as official acts because they are neither normal State functions nor functions that a State
alone ... can perform.") (citations omitted).
41. Id, citing Eichmnann, 36 ILR 312 (1962); Pinochet (Lords Hutton and Phillips); Pinocbet I (Lords Steyn
and Nicholls); and the Bouterse case, Hof 20 Nov 2000 (Neth).
42. See text accompanying note 25.
43. Congo v Belgium, separate opinion at 58 (cited in note 3).
44. See Sharon at 15 (cited in note 5).
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stronger assertion of the importance of sovereignty in making these decisions. But
further, the majority's rejection of the emergence of CIL around international
prosecution of officials for "serious international crimes," and its pointed exclusion of
the Pinochet scenario from situations in which such officials may be prosecuted, leaves
the fate of even prosecutions of former officials in doubt. While the language of the
main concurrence in the case attempts to salvage the Pinocbet precedent, it is not clear
that it was able to do so.
Whether this is a positive development is open to debate. As the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law points out, sovereign immunity and its derivatives "have been
justified ... as necessary for the effective conduct of international intercourse and the
maintenance of friendly relations" between nations." Further, the concurrence's
argument in Congo v. Belgium that the exceptions to official immunity allowed by the
majority will not sufficiently guard against the "specter of impunity" for heinous acts is
not fully supported by the historical record. In the past half century, the community
of nations has several times arrived at a consensus that it will intervene to bring justice
to countries incapable of providing it themselves, such as Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. The past year has seen not just the dismissal of the Yerodia and Sharon
prosecutions in Belgium, but the birth of the International Criminal Court. Finally,
democracy and the rule of law are arguably on the rise in the international community,
and with them domestic institutions capable of trying officials who have committed
serious crimes at home.
45. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, ch 2, Introductory Note
(1986).
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